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Abstract This article identifies problems with regard to providing criteria that regulate the
matching of logical formulae and natural language. We then take on to solve these problems
by defining a necessary and sufficient criterion of adequate formalization. On the basis of this
criterion we argue that logic should not be seen as an ars iudicandi capable of evaluating the
validity or invalidity of informal arguments, but as an ars explicandi that renders transparent
the formal structure of informal reasoning.
Keywords Logic · Philosophy of logic · Theory of formalization · Applied logic
1 Introduction
The problem of adequately transforming statements of natural language into the formalism
of standard propositional or predicate logic is a problem most students of logic encounter
without being presented with satisfactory solutions.1 Introductions to standard logic usually
illustrate the formalization of natural language with a handful of paradigmatic examples sup-
plemented with commentaries to the effect that formalization is essentially based on an artistic
skill that cannot be regularized or taught methodically. Adequate formalization, according
to the standard view, is a matter of experience and should thus not be a focus of a logician’s
interest. Nevertheless, formalizations are frequently used as a means to reconstruct arguments
or to prove theorems, e.g. in metamathematics or mathematical logic. The adequacy of the
adopted formalizations, however, is hardly ever substantiated, as this is seen as a matter of
1 Throughout this article we confine our discussions to first-order formalization. For the sake of simplicity,
we thus abstain from explicitly relativizing our definitions to first-order logic.
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linguistic intuition or taken to be sufficiently legitimized by common practice. The widespread
neglect to justify formalizations involved in proofs becomes unsatisfactory when it comes
to choosing among alternative formalizations or to answering questions that arise when the
effort to come up with arguments for or against given formalizations is actually made. Proofs
involving the transformation of ordinary language to a formalism, such as validity proofs of
ordinary language arguments or proofs of metamathematical theorems, are convincing only
if they rely on a systematic understanding of the adequacy of the formalizations resorted to.2
The literature explicitly addressing the formalization of natural language can be broadly
subdivided into two groups: On the one side, there are the authors claiming that formalizations
of natural language should and can be generated by an effective procedure that takes sign
sequences of colloquial language as inputs and produces adequate formalizations as outputs.
On the other side, there is a group of authors which, rather than advancing formalization pro-
cedures, develop criteria (or guidelines) that are intended to determine (or help determine)
whether a given formula is an adequate formal representation of a given natural language
text. Davidson’s theory of meaning, Chomsky’s generative grammar and, most of all, Mon-
tague’s universal grammar are the best known approaches to formalization that implicitly or
explicitly subscribe to the ambitious project to define an effective formalization procedure
(cf. e.g. Davidson 1984; Chomsky 1977; Montague and Thomason 1974). While Davidson
contends himself with programmatic declarations to the effect that the availability of such a
procedure is a precondition of an adequate theory of meaning, Chomsky and Montague have
actually undertaken the effort to partially sketch the details of such a procedure. However,
even though Chomsky refers to one of the outputs of his procedure as “logical forms” (LF),
he clearly distinguishes a linguist’s LFs from a logician’s logical forms or formalizations.3
Montague, in turn, substantially constrains the class of colloquial texts which he claims to
be tractable by his formalization procedure. For instance, the theory of language which he
devises in Montague (1974b) involves a translation function that assigns expressions of an
intensional formalism to textual arguments belonging to a disambiguated, i.e. non-natural,
language.4 In contrast, while the fragment of English which he mechanically formalizes in
Montague (1974a) features ambiguities, it only contains about three dozen basic expressions.
All in all, thus, the project of developing an effective formalization procedure that would link
natural languages and first-order logic is not even close to a successful completion. More-
over, that this project is successfully completable can be doubted in principle. Its completion
would require solutions to intricate linguistic problems as, for instance, the context sensitivity
of colloquial statements, which is far from being mechanically resolvable. Furthermore, the
so-called misleading form thesis (cf. e.g. Brun 2004, ch. 7.1) raises principal philosophical
objections against the claim that a statement’s logical formalization, in one way or another,
hinges on its surface grammar. Rather than on its grammatical surface, the formalization of
a natural language utterance depends on the latter’s informal interpretation, which is notori-
ously ambiguous and context dependent.
2 Here and throughout this paper two categories of proofs must be kept apart. The first category consists of
proofs involving formalizations as (in)validity proofs of arguments and many mathematical and metamath-
ematical proofs, and the second comprises the proofs that do not rest on formalizations as formal proofs by
syntactic transformations of formulae. In Sect. 4 we shall show that the proofs of the first category can only
be said to be proofs in a weak sense, i.e. proofs which formally explicate informal reasoning. They are not
proofs in a strong sense according to which a proof is an evaluation of informal reasoning.
3 Cf. e.g. Chomsky (1986), p. 67, footnote 11: “The status and properties of LF are empirical matters, not
to be settled in terms of considerations of valid inference and the like”. For more details on the relationship
between LFs and standard logical forms cf. e.g. Neale (1994).
4 For an introduction to Montague’s Universal Grammar cf. Link (1979).
123
Synthese (2008) 164:93–115 95
In this paper, thus, we do not presuppose that adequate formalizations can be mechani-
cally generated from colloquial texts and, accordingly, we are not going to further discuss the
efforts to define effective formalization procedures.5 Instead, we assume the starting point of
logical formalization to consist in interpretations of natural language texts and focus on the
literature concerned with criteria of adequate formalization that serve to justify or evaluate
formalization attempts. There exists only a handful of studies, including Blau (1977), Epstein
(1990, 1994), Sainsbury (1991), or recently and most thoroughly Brun (2004), that explicitly
focuss on the design of formalization criteria. To this second, criteria-driven thread in the
formalization literature Brun (2004), p. 269, refers as the traditional project of formalization.
Within this project, the studies mentioned above devise what we call the traditional picture
of logical formalization. None of the representatives of the traditional picture claim to offer
sets of rules that would be severally necessary and jointly sufficient to resolve controversial
mappings of logical formulae to statements. Rather, by reconstructing the theoretical under-
pinnings of the usual practice, they attempt to develop informal guidelines that shall help
to clarify controversial formalizations. By identifying problems of the traditional picture we
show that the usual practice is not a serviceable guide when it comes to defining consistent
criteria of adequate formalization. We then go on to solve these problems by developing a
necessary and sufficient criterion of adequate formalization which essentially rests on the
insight that logical formalization cannot be separated from semantic analysis. We label this
new approach within the traditional project the new picture of adequate formalization.
2 The traditional picture
In this section we discuss two main features of the traditional picture: criteria of correctness
and surface maxims. We identify problems of a syntactic as well as of a semantic criterion
of correctness and argue that customary surface maxims cannot serve as criteria of adequate
formalization.
2.1 Preliminaries
Among the representatives of the traditional picture Blau (1977) and Brun (2004) most explic-
itly argue that formalizations of natural language texts are adequate if (I) they are correct,
(II) they are maximally faithful to the syntactic surface of the respective text, and (III) they
exhibit a unity of logical form, i.e. they are either equivalent or they represent the same form
on various levels of specification. The first two determinants of the traditional picture prompt
non-relational criteria of adequate formalization, while the third results in relational ones. We
address the non-relational criteria of adequacy in this paper—Sects. 2.2 and 2.3, respectively
— while (III) constitutes the focus of our article The Unity of Logical Form (unpublished).
All three determinants of the traditional picture give rise to problems, some of which are
acknowledged in the literature others are not. We argue that these defects are severe enough
to replace the traditional by a new picture of logical formalization.
Before (I) and (II) are clarified, the object of formalization needs to be specified: It is usu-
ally presumed that logical formalization starts with a text T (a finite sequence of signs) which
is analyzed to be composed of A1, . . . , An such that A1, . . . , An are statements capable of
5 Even if the misleading form thesis is not taken to refute the procedure-driven approach to logical formaliza-
tion, it is plain that the availability of formalization criteria is conceptually prior to a successful development of
formalization procedures. Any such procedure must prove its strength by generating adequate formalizations,
which adequacy has to be assessable with recourse to criteria.
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being true or false and T is interpretable as a truth-function of A1, . . . , An only. We call such
a truth-functional analysis of T an interpretation of T . An interpretation can be expressed
by means of a well-formed concatenation of A1, . . . , An using truth-functional connectives,
such that equivalent concatenations constitute the same interpretation. A1, . . . , An may have
identical truth conditions and may be identical in type, i.e. they may be representable by
one and the same sentence. The truth-functional decomposition of T is not required to result
from a syntactic analysis that fragments texts with respect to criteria such as full stops or
syncategorematic phrases as “and”, “or”, “if . . . then . . . ” etc. T may well be composed of
questions or exclamations as e.g. the text T1: “Is it raining? Yes! Then we take the umbrella”.
In this case, T1 might be interpreted as a truth-function of the two statements (i) “It is raining”
and (ii) “We take the umbrella”, such that T1 is true unless (i) is true and (ii) is false. Thus, the
decomposition of a text into statements capable of being true or false is an interpretative task
that is not a part of logical formalization. It is to be conducted prior to formalizing T . The
criteria of formalization available in the literature are usually confined to the formalization of
single statements. We shall follow this practice in this section and take up the formalization
of compound texts in the next.
2.2 Correctness
The correctness of a formalization is alternatively assessed with recourse to a syntactic or
a semantic criterion of correctness. The syntactic criterion evaluates correctness based on a
comparison of formal and informal inferential dependencies among formalizations and cor-
responding statements, and the semantic criterion compares truth conditions of statements
and their formulae. The criteria of correctness shall be discussed in that order.
Syntactically, correctness of a formalization  of a statement A is defined in terms of
(COR):6
(COR) The formalization  of a statement A is correct iff every inference S, such that the
formalization  of S contains  as a premise or a conclusion and  is formally
valid, is informally valid.
More concisely put, (COR) stipulates
, L  ⇒ A, C I B and
 L  ⇒ D I A
where ,  are the formalizations of the statements A and B, respectively, and ,  are sets
of the formalizations of the statements contained in the sets C and D (,, C, D may be
empty), while L stands for formal validity and I represents informal validity.
An inference is valid iff, given the truth of its premises, its consequences cannot be false.
Furthermore, while formal validity is to be understood on the basis of a respective calculus, an
inference is said to be informally valid if it is judged to be valid without compulsory recourse
to any criterion of its validity. Similarly, we often use expressions correctly without being
able to define them or justify their application. In this sense, informal validity constitutes the
unquestionable basis for formalizations of natural language.7
6 Cf. e.g. Blau (1977), p. 4, Brun (2004), p. 214.
7 Making the adequacy of formalizations dependent on the notion of informal validity has considerable con-
sequences for the sense in which the validity or invalidity of colloquial arguments can be said to be provable.
This problem and the question as to what contribution to the definition of criteria of adequate formalization
can be expected from a concept as vague as informal validity will be addressed in Sect. 4.
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(COR) is seen as a necessary condition of the adequacy of a formalization. It states that
a formula assigned to a statement is inadequate if it allows for inferences that the statement
does not sanction or if it follows from premises the corresponding statement does not infor-
mally follow from. According to (COR), formalizing any statement by p along with a suitable
realization is always correct.8 In case of non-tautologous and non-contradictory statements
(COR) demands that realizations informally suit the formalized statement. This is illustrated
by the following example:
(a) Shamus likes cheese.
p (1)
p : Winston likes ham. (2)
While (1) is (COR)-correct for its own verbalization as induced by (2), i.e. for “Winston likes
ham”, (1) is not a correct formalization of (a), because p is formally equivalent to p, whereas
“Shamus likes cheese” is not informally equivalent to “Winston likes ham”. (COR), thus,
identifies (2) as an unsuitable realization with respect to a formalization of (a).
However, the application of (COR) faces a termination problem. Any formula implies
an infinite number of other formulae. To see this, it suffices to consider ∨-introduction:
A  A ∨ B. (COR) requires that it be verified for all of these inferences whether they have
informal counterparts or not—a task that obviously cannot be completed. That means whether
a formalization is correct in terms of (COR) can only be falsified. Moreover, as Brun (2004),
p. 217, points out this termination problem induces yet another difficulty for the applica-
tion of the correctness criterion. Suppose we are to evaluate the correctness of a formula 
assigned to a statement A. In order to do so, we are to check whether, say,  L , which
we assume to be (formally) valid, has an informal counterpart. This apparently presupposes
that  is assigned to another statement B such that we are then able to evaluate whether B in
fact informally follows from A, which, in turn, presupposes the correctness of formalizing B
by . Therefore, the evaluation of the correctness of a single formalization  is not indepen-
dent of the correctness of other formalizations. This, again, presupposes that  is a correct
formalization of A. Thus, the application of (COR) gives rise to a circularity problem.
The fact that the correctness and, hence, the adequacy of the formalizations of different
statements are interdependent might not be seen as problematic to somebody maintaining
a holistic view of logical formalization as e.g. Davidson (1980), pp. 139–140, who claims
that the adequacy of all formalizations of all statements of a language must be assessed as a
whole. According to such an account, no formalization is ever unquestionably established to
be correct. Every seemingly correct formalization constantly risks to be identified as incor-
rect in light of other formalizations. Thus, whoever adopts such a holistic view no longer
considers (COR) to be a criterion of formalization which determines for each formalization
candidate whether it correctly captures a given statement or not. Within a holistic framework,
(COR) becomes a mere rule of thumb. As indicated in the introduction, however, we are here
concerned with criteria of adequate formalization, not with rules of thumb. If (COR) is taken
to be a formalization criterion, the mutual interdependence of the correctness of manifold
formalizations is highly problematic as, due to that interdependence, (COR) is affected by
the circularity problem.
8 Cf. Blau (1977), p. 7, and Brun (2004), p. 210 et sqq., 240–241. The notion of a realization is here being used
along the lines of Epstein (1994), p. 13, i.e. in terms of an assignment of expressions of natural language to the
categorematic parts of a formula. The categorematic expressions contained in a formula are its propositional
variables, proper names and predicate letters. In the literature, terms as “correspondence scheme”, “scheme
of abbreviation”, “dictionary” or “key” are used synonymously with “realization” (for details cf. Brun (2004),
p. 140, footnote 3).
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Yet, as mentioned above, correctness does not necessarily have to be spelled out by syn-
tactic criteria, it can be assessed semantically as well. The basic idea behind a semantic
criterion of correctness can be concisely put, its detailed formulation, however—as will be
shown below—is more intricate. Semantically, a formalization  of a statement A is said
to be correct iff  and A have the same conditions of truth and falsehood. Postponing the
question as to how exactly conditions of truth and falsehood of formulae and statements can
be compared, it is worth to point out that an application of a semantic criterion of correctness
is free from circularities. Contrary to (COR), assessing the correctness of a formalization
 on semantic grounds does not presuppose the correctness of other formalizations. None-
theless, as (COR), a semantic criterion of correctness is affected by a termination problem.
Formal semantics of first-order logic generates an infinite amount of interpretations for a
formula, based on which truth and falsehood of that formula are evaluated. Therefore, as
long as the application of the semantic criterion does not yield a discrepancy between truth
conditions of a statement and its formalization, the correctness of that formalization is not
determinable—the application of the criterion simply does not terminate.
Contrary to the (COR)-variant of the termination problem, however, there are proposals to
secure the termination of a semantic assessment of correctness available in the literature. Blau
(1977) and Brun (2004) attempt to evade the semantic variant of the termination problem by
stipulating that evaluating the correctness of a formalization by means of semantic criteria
does not require balancing all truth conditions of a statement and its formalization separately.
It suffices to match general descriptions of suitable classes of interpretations. Brun (2004),
p. 211, illustrates what this means by the following example:
(b) All animals have a head. ∀x(Fx → Gx) (3)
F : . . . is an animal; G : . . . has a head (4)
The models of (3) and the circumstances in which (b) is true can be described structurally:
The extension of F is a subset of the extension of G((F) ⊆ (G)), i.e. animals constitute
a subset of the headed objects. (3) and (b) are false iff there is at least one object contained in
the extension of F but not of G((F)  (G)), i.e. iff there is at least one unheaded animal.
If the conditions of truth and falsehood of (3) and (b) coincide with respect to these structural
descriptions—thus Brun’s proposal to solve the termination problem—the application of the
semantic criterion terminates and attests the correctness of (3).9
Prima facie, thus, the prospects of the semantic criterion of correctness seem to be very
promising. However, as anticipated above, a closer look at the details of this criterion reveals
that it faces a serious problem of its own. Put briefly, in order to guarantee the comparabil-
ity of the truth conditions of formulae and statements and to ensure the equivalence of the
syntactic and the semantic criterion, the interpretative space of formal semantics must be
confined in a way that seriously endangers the whole endeavor of logical formalization. As
will be substantiated promptly, the core of this problem stems from the fact that according to
the traditional picture not all interpretations of formulae can be evaluated informally, but only
suitable ones. Let us hence discuss the details of a semantic notion of correctness. Ordinarily,
it is spelled out as follows:10
9 Brun does not offer a procedure or a criterion that identifies the structural descriptions of truth condi-
tions. Generating these descriptions is left to informal intuition. In Lampert (2006) a mechanical procedure
is developed for first-order logic that, given a formula , construes structural descriptions of the models and
counter-models of  in a finite number of steps. By applying this procedure and paraphrasing the resulting
structural descriptions the solution of this termination problem can be completed.
10 Cf. e.g. Brun (2004), p. 210.
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(TC) The formalization  of a statement A is correct iff relative to all suitable interpreta-
tions s of ,  has the same conditions of truth and falsehood as A has according
to the informal judgement.
The application of (TC) presupposes that it is determined what truth and falsehood conditions
of formulae are as opposed to truth and falsehood conditions of statements and how these
conditions can be compared. According to (TC), this comparability shall be guaranteed by
suitable interpretations. Thus, two notions involved in (TC) call for clarifications: suitable
interpretation and sameness of truth and falsehood conditions.
Suitable interpretations of a formula for Blau (1977) and Brun (2004) are interpretations
of the propositional variables, of the proper names and of the predicate letters that are limited
in extent due to informal inferential dependencies among the natural language expressions
that are assigned to the categorematic parts of a formula by a given realization. The sort of
limitation involved in suitable interpretations is best clarified by concrete examples. First,
consider statement (c) along with its forthright formalization (5) and realization (6).
(c) Cameron is a mother or Cameron is a woman.
p ∨ q (5)
p : Cameron is a mother.; q : Cameron is a woman. (6)
The set of suitable interpretations of (5) does not contain 4 elements as would be generated
by formal semantics, but only 3—more precisely, instead of (p) = T,(q) = T ; (p) =
T,(q) = F; (p) = F,(q) = T ; (p) = F,(q) = F , it only comprises the following
3 interpretations: (p) = T,(q) = T ; (p) = F,(q) = T ; (p) = F,(q) = F . On
informal grounds, it is excluded that something is a mother but no woman. This informal
judgement, accordingly, eliminates (p) = T,(q) = F from the set of suitable interpre-
tations of (5). It is this elimination that allows for comparing the truth conditions of (5) and
(c) in the first place. Were (p) = T,(q) = F not discarded, formal semantics would
confront us with a configuration that informally could not be judged coherently, because
from Cameron’s motherhood the truth of (c) follows, whereas Cameron not being a woman
implies the falsehood of (c). Consequently, (TC) would be inapplicable. Hence, suitable inter-
pretations result from ordinary interpretations by limiting the interpretative space of formal
semantics due to informal inferential dependencies.11 This constraint is warranted—thus the
standard arguments in the literature—because truth conditions of statements and formulae
are guaranteed to be comparable only within limited interpretative spaces.12
The truth conditions of a formalization  of a statement A consist in the models of 
among its suitable interpretations, i.e. in its suitable models. Thereagainst, the falsehood
conditions of  consist in its suitable counter-models. The truth and falsehood conditions of
A, on the other hand, are generated by paraphrasing the suitable interpretations relative to a
given realization of  and informally assessing the truth values of A with recourse to these
paraphrases. For instance, the paraphrases of the suitable interpretations of (5) in virtue of
its realization (6) are the following: (i) “Cameron is a mother”, “Cameron is a woman”; (ii)
11 Sainsbury (1991), p. 64, restricts the interpretative space of formal semantics even further: “A necessary
condition for adequacy is that every sentence in the formalization should be true (false) on an intended inter-
pretation iff the corresponding English sentence is true (false)”. For propositional logic Sainsbury defines an
intended interpretation to be an interpretation “which assigns to the relevant sentence-letters the same truth
values as the ones the corresponding English sentences possess”.
12 In a very similar vein, Quine (1953), p. 439, takes one of the most conspicuous characteristics of a nat-
ural language to be its truth value gaps which, according to him, must be ignored upon formalizing natural
language.
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“Cameron is no mother”, “Cameron is a woman”; (iii) “Cameron is no mother”, “Cameron
is no woman”. Under conditions (i) and (ii) the statement (c) is informally judged to be true.
Thus, the truth conditions of (c) are (i) and (ii). Whereas (iii) is the falsehood condition of (c),
because when Cameron is neither a mother nor a woman, (c) is informally judged to be false.
A comparison of the truth and falsehood conditions of a statement A and its formalization 
amounts to confronting the suitable models and counter-models of  with those paraphrases
of the suitable interpretations that are informally seen to render A true and false, respec-
tively. The models and counter-models are evaluated by formal semantics, their paraphrases
are judged informally. (TC)—by stipulating sameness of truth and falsehood conditions of 
and A—demands that the informal judgement determines the paraphrases of suitable models
and counter-models to render the formalized statement true and false, respectively.
However, limiting the interpretative space of formal semantics13 in this vein gives rise to
a serious problem. (TC) is not embedded in classical semantics of first-order logic, because
when (TC) is applied, interpretations  of a formula  can be discarded. That means (TC)
induces a revision of the semantics of logical formulae to the effect that the latter no longer
mean what they mean according to classical semantics. This revision changes the whole
logic of first-order formulae. For instance, if the interpretation (p) = F,(q) = F of the
formula p ∨ q is eliminated from the set of suitable interpretations, p ∨ q is interpreted in
terms of a tautology, which obviously it is not according to propositional logic. Thus, strictly
speaking, (TC) is no criterion that regulates formalization within first-order logic. It cannot
even be claimed that (TC) regulates formalization within any logic, because the semantics
of the formulae are no longer taken at face value. Using a logical notation while selectively
adapting its interpretation amounts to confusing formal and informal reasoning and reduces
logical notation to stenography. Semantic criteria of adequate formalization must draw on the
semantics of their target logic as a whole—one cannot restrict semantics in order to obtain
adequate formalizations. When formalizing within some logic L, the latter’s semantics needs
to be presupposed without restriction. If the semantics of L prohibits adequate formalizations
of a text T , T simply cannot be formalized within L.14 Thus, (TC) suffers from the problem
of suitable interpretations.
This problem arises whenever the semantic criterion of correctness is intended to be
equivalent to (COR). In order to see this, reconsider statement (c), “Cameron is a mother or
Cameron is a woman”, and its formalization (5), p ∨ q , with realization (6), which is correct
according to (COR) and (TC). Yet, if (p) = T,(q) = F were not discarded, (5) would no
longer have the same truth conditions as (c). (p) = T,(q) = F renders (5) true, whereas
Cameron being a mother and no woman is no meaningful truth condition of (c), because a
corresponding informal judgement would be incoherent (see p. 8). Thus, if the comparison of
truth conditions as induced by (TC) were not limited to suitable interpretations, the semantic
criterion of correctness would not be equivalent to the syntactic criterion (COR).
The problem of suitable interpretations shall be postponed for now. We come back to
it below and propose a solution for it. For the time being, the traditional picture needs to
13 It might be objected that the notion of a suitable interpretation, strictly speaking, does not limit the inter-
pretative space of formal semantics, but merely determines that certain interpretations generated by formal
semantics must be ignored when it comes to comparing truth conditions of statements and formulae. However,
whether such a comparison is said to require that certain interpretations be eliminated or merely ignored is of
terminological relevance at best. Limiting the interpretative space of formal semantics may, thus, alternatively
be understood in terms of eliminating or of ignoring unsuitable interpretations.
14 Such a view is implicitly endorsed by Strawson (1952), ch. 6. Strawson is not ready to ignore truth value
gaps when formalizing natural language and, consequently, identifies a host of statements which he claims
not to be adequately formalizable in first-order logic.
123
Synthese (2008) 164:93–115 101
be complemented by introducing the second non-relational constraint (cf. p. 3) ordinarily
imposed on adequate formalizations: adherence to the syntax of formalized texts.
2.3 Surface maxims
In the literature, criteria of correctness are usually complemented by maxims which deter-
mine the adequacy of a formalization to not only hinge on its capturing the informally judged
truth and falsehood conditions of a statement, but which moreover demand to do justice to the
syntax of that statement. The additional maxims demanding syntax adherence are induced by
the problem of trivialization. In regards to formalizing arguments this problem can be illus-
trated by what Blau (1977), pp. 17–18, calls unscrupulous formalizing. Consider argument
(d) along with its formalization (7) and realization (8).
(d) Cameron is a mother. Therefore, Cameron is a woman.
Fa ∧ Ga → Ga (7)
a : Cameron; F : …is a mother; G : …is a woman (8)
First of all, note that representatives of the traditional picture often formalize arguments by
means of argument schemes involving operators as “” or “∴” that belong to metalanguage.
Within first-order object language, however, the informal validity of arguments can only be
captured in terms of formal implications. As we are exclusively concerned with first-order
formalizations in the present context, we dispense with metalingual operators in formaliza-
tion candidates throughout this paper.15 Against this background, (7) and (8) constitute a
formalization that captures the premise and the conclusion of (d) as well as the whole argu-
ment in a both syntactically and semantically correct way. Unscrupulously formalizing an
informally valid argument, thus, amounts to conjunctively adding a formula representing the
conclusion to the formula(e) assigned to the premises.16
Trivializations of formalization efforts can even be aggravated. For instance, (COR) and
(TC) allow for assigning any formal tautology to an informally tautologous statement as “It is
raining or it is not raining”. Clearly however, only a very specific subset of formal tautologies
can be considered to adequately represent that statement. Were the adequacy of a formal-
ization only dependent on (COR) and (TC), formalizing natural language would amount to
an utterly trivial and non-illuminative endeavor. Not only is it compatible with (COR) and
(TC) to assign an arbitrary tautology to any informally valid argument, all informally valid
arguments can be assigned to one and the same tautology. Moreover, informally equivalent
statements as
(e) Not all martians are green.
(f) Some martians are not green.
can generally be (COR)- and (TC)-correctly formalized by identical formulae, irrespective of
whether their syntactic differences might be accountable for in the corresponding formalism
or not. Thus, formalizing both (e) and (f) by ¬∀x(Fx → Gx), given a suitable realization,
fully conforms to (COR) and (TC). Yet, formalizing (e) and (f) by one and the same formula
 reduces the formal proof of their equivalence to proving  ↔  and, hence, completely
15 This restriction to the first-order syntax is explicitly advanced as a possible formalization strategy by
representatives of the traditional picture as Epstein (1990), p. 24, or Brun (2004), pp. 46, 243.
16 If it is presumed that an argument is formalized correctly only if all its component statements are formalized
correctly, this trivialization problem merely affects arguments involving one single premise (cf. Brun (2004),
p. 240 et sqq., for a detailed discussion of the trivialization problem).
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trivializes it. Considering (COR) and (TC) sufficient to identify adequate formalizations
would trivialize every equivalence proof.
Surface maxims are thus introduced in order to identify adequate formulae given sets of
formalizations that equally conform to (COR) and (TC). For instance, there are some obvi-
ous syntactic differences between (e) and (f). (e) mentions something that not every martian
complies with, whereas (f) talks of some martians. Accordingly, in addition to compliance
with (COR) and (TC) it is stipulated that the syntactic features of these statements must be
represented by formulae adequately assigned to them. Though the formula ¬∀x(Fx → Gx)
mirrors the syntax of (e), its syntactic features do not have a counterpart in (f). Surface maxims
are designed thus that they determine the aforementioned formula to adequately represent
(e), but not (f).
Basically there are two directions available with regard to explicating how formulae rep-
resent syntactic features of a statement: (I) A syntactic feature of a formula must have a
counterpart in the statement; (II) a syntactic feature of a statement must have a counterpart
in the formula. Both of these directions can be found in formalization strategies available
in the literature. While Brun’s (2004) surface maxims are oriented in terms of (I),17 Epstein
(1994) formalizes by abstracting from the content of statements in a stepwise manner and,
thus, adopts strategy (II). Neither of these orientations of surface maxims yields necessary
or sufficient criteria of adequate formalization. Take, for instance, formula (9):
(g) Men are mortal. Shamus is a man. Therefore, Shamus is mortal.
∀x(Fx → Gx) ∧ Fa → Ga (9)
a : Shamus; F : …is a man; G : …is mortal (10)
The formalization of the first premise of (9) is generally seen as an adequate formalization of
“Men are mortal”. Yet, it features a universal quantifier and a conditional, neither of which
has a counterpart in (g). While a syntactic maxim in the vein of (I) may well distinguish
between formulae adequately ascribed to (e) and (f), a maxim oriented in terms of (II) would
misleadingly dictate to assign different formulae to:
(h) This conclusion is invalid.
(i) This conclusion is not valid.
The syntactic difference between (h) and (i) must not be captured by a difference in the
formula adequately assigned to these statements. Furthermore, it would be inaccurate to
predicate inadequacy of formalizations of statements containing an “if and only if” simply
because the formalism resorted to does not feature the connective “↔”. Surface maxims
cannot be used as necessary or sufficient conditions for the adequacy of formalizations. They
cannot be applied unconditionally such that they always pick one formula whose paraphrase
is syntactically most similar to the corresponding statement. Their application must be rel-
ativized to a formalism and classes of equally correct formulae available as formalization
candidates (cf. Sect. 3.2).
3 The new picture
This section introduces the idea of a complete formalization by first discussing the syntactic
completeness criterion available in the literature. Completeness is commonly not seen as a
17 Cf. also Sainsbury (1991), p. 69.
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requirement adequate formalizations have to meet, because the version of this criterion pro-
vided in the literature not only suffers from a syntactic but also from a semantic termination
problem. In this section we want to show that completeness has been discarded prematurely.
Not only can a completeness criterion be devised in an operationalizable way, it moreover
paves the way to solutions of the difficulties faced by the traditional picture. To this end,
we first syntactically define completeness in a way that no longer gives rise to a semantic
termination problem. Analogously to correctness, however, the application of our syntactic
variant of completeness does not terminate. In consequence, we then go on to introduce a
criterion which semantically captures both completeness and correctness and which we claim
to be immune to all problems of the traditional criteria.
3.1 Completeness
The literature provides sketches of an additional adequacy criterion. Blau (1977) and Brun
(2004) consider a syntactic criterion of completeness, yet discard it as necessary condition of
adequate formalization because they take it to be too strong and to lack applicability. Spelling
out what completeness of a formalization amounts to requires some conceptual preliminar-
ies, because the existing version of this criterion crucially rests on a specialized notion of
informal validity: informal formal validity. In order to clarify that notion, consider again the
arguments (g) and (d):
(g) Men are mortal. Shamus is a man. Therefore, Shamus is mortal.
(d) Cameron is a mother. Therefore, Cameron is a woman.
(g) and (d) shall be taken to be valid on informal grounds. According to a prevalent view,
statements have certain consequences merely due to their form and others due to the meaning
of their constituents.18 The former are consequences based on informally formally valid argu-
ments, while the latter result from informally materially valid arguments.19 This difference
is illustrated by (g) and (d). While (g) is commonly held to be valid on account of its plain
form or syntax, it takes conceptual analysis of the notion of a mother to justify the informal
validity of (d).
With recourse to the notion of informal formal validity completeness of a formalization
 of a statement A can be defined as follows:
(COM) The formalization  of a statement A is complete iff every formalization , such
that  is the formalization of an inference S and contains  as a premise or a
conclusion and S is informally formally valid, is formally valid.
More concisely put, (COM) stipulates
A, C If B ⇒ , L  and
D If A ⇒  L 
where ,  are the formalizations of the statements A and B, respectively, and ,  are sets
of the formalizations of the statements contained in the sets C and D (,, C, D may be
empty), while L stands for formal validity and If represents informal formal validity.
As we have seen in Sect. 2.2, formalizing any statement by p is always correct. Yet,
many formalizations that are commonly viewed as adequate illustrate that the adequacy of
formalizations is often judged with recourse to further criteria than merely correctness and
18 Cf. Davidson (1967), Epstein (1990), Brun (2004).
19 For this distinction see Brun (2004), pp. 37–40 and pp. 327–334.
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surface similarity. To mention only a few well known formalization efforts that exemplify this
practice: The formalization of Aristotelian syllogisms, Russell’s analysis of definite descrip-
tions or Davidson’s account of action sentences were all motivated by the urge to formally
represent informally valid arguments. Common practice, hence, not only aims for correct
formalizations, but, furthermore, sometimes strives for a formal representation of the inner
structure of a statement. By demanding completeness of a formalization, as expressed in
(COM), it is stipulated that p is not necessarily adequate for any statement. As per (COM), it
might be necessary to exhibit the inner structure of a statement in order to formally reproduce
its informal consequences.
However, while completeness might in fact be an implicit motive behind many actual
formalization efforts, completeness as expressed in (COM) is seriously defective. A first
deficiency stems from the latter’s dependency on the notion of informal formal validity. The
distinction between informally formally and informally materially valid arguments is by far
not as clear-cut as (g) and (d) prima facie might suggest. For in what sense can (g) be said to be
informally formally valid, while (d) can only claim informal material validity? As anticipated
above, answering this question with reference to the logical forms of (g) and (d) suggests
itself: (g) is valid in virtue of its form, while the validity of (d) stems from its semantic
features. Yet, what is the argumentative backing of this stipulation? How are logical forms of
statements identified? The syntax of natural language is ambiguous to the extent that logical
forms of statements and arguments cannot be identified based on syntactic or grammati-
cal criteria. The literature abounds with examples that illustrate this deficiency of natural
language.20 Consider, for instance, statements as “Horses are animals” whose commonly
assigned logical form involves universal quantifiers and conditionals, both of which are lack-
ing in the statement. Or take adjectival modification which sometimes corresponds to logical
forms comprising conjunctions. The only way to identify the logical form of a statement is
to assign a formula to that statement according to criteria of adequate formalization.21
That means explicating the difference between (g) and (d) with reference to their logical
forms amounts to—consonantly with the usual practice—advancing the formal implication
(11) as adequate formalization of (g), whereas the material implication (12) is considered to
be adequate for (d):
∀x(Fx → Gx) ∧ Fa → Ga (11)
Fa → Ga. (12)
Ascribing a universally quantified conditional to (g)’s premise illustrates that the formaliza-
tion of a statement may well introduce syntactic features that do not have a correspondent
in the statement. This finding, in turn, raises doubts as to whether (12) in fact constitutes
the logical form of (d). These doubts are even intensified in light of examples as Davidson’s
formalization of action sentences which is commonly considered to be perfectly adequate:
(j) Cameron strolls through Bologna. Therefore, there is a stroll.
(j), according to Davidson’s (1967) proposal, is adequately formalized as follows:
∃x(Fx ∧ Gxa ∧ H xb) → ∃x Fx (13)
The premise of (j) is, hence, rendered explicit as “There is a stroll and it is conducted by
Cameron and it takes place in Bologna”. (j) and (13) illustrate that adequate formalizations
20 Cf. Sainsbury (1991), pp. 339–340.
21 We take an in-depth look at how logical forms of natural language texts are identified in Lampert and
Baumgartner (unpublished).
123
Synthese (2008) 164:93–115 105
sometimes introduce predicates that do not occur in the formalized statement. Correspond-
ingly, (d) might just as well be analyzed in terms of the formal implication (14) rather than
(12).
Ga ∧ Ha → Ga, (14)
where G represents “. . . is a woman” and H stands for “. . . has a child”. Thus F , which
represents “. . . is a mother”, is analyzed as a conjunction of G and H . While attributing
(12) to (d) yields the latter’s validity to be of material nature, according to the conceptual
analysis applied in (14), (d) would have to be seen as informally formally valid after all. If
(13) is accepted as an adequate formalization of (j) and as showing that (j) is formally valid,
one cannot reject (14) as an adequate formalization of (d) and hold that (d) is not formally
valid.22 Conceptual analysis is an integral part of formalizing natural language. There is no
clear demarcation line for the amount of conceptual analysis used in formalizing natural lan-
guage. Furthermore, the question as to the formal or material nature of (d)’s validity can only
be settled upon determining which of (12) and (14) constitutes an adequate formalization of
(d). All of this shows that spelling out the difference between informal formal and informal
material validity presupposes clarity about adequate formalization. The latter notion is more
basic than the notion of logical form and more basic than the conceptual distinction between
informal formal and informal material validity. Accordingly, recurring to this distinction in
a criterion of adequate formalization as (COM) renders the latter fundamentally circular.
In order to secure the criterion of completeness against these circularities the difference
between informal formal and informal material validity must be dropped as done by Witt-
genstein. For Wittgenstein there is no validity other than logical validity.23 Whatever is
informally valid must be shown to be valid on formal grounds by means of logical formal-
ization involving conceptual analysis. Every informally valid argument is to be formalized
by a formal implication. In particular, (12) is not an adequate formalization of (d). In the
following we adopt Sainsbury’s label Tractarian view to denote that position.24
There are three main reasons commonly put forward as to why (COM) is not based on
the Tractarian view and is, thus, specified with recourse to the formal–material distinction
among informally valid inferences. A first objection against the Tractarian view is motivated
by the urge to keep the task of formalizing natural language as free from semantic detours as
possible. Yet, as the foregoing reasoning has shown, this demand cannot be fulfilled without
circularities. Second, it is argued that statements involving color exclusion cannot, in prin-
ciple, be formally captured.25 That means subject to this line of argument there is no formal
contradiction that could be seen as an adequate formalization of an informally contradictory
statement as “This spot is red and green at the same time”. However, this criticism of the Trac-
tarian view does not take into account that there may be a previously unthought of analysis of
color predicates or new formalisms that are especially suited for statements involving color
exclusion.26 Even if no such custom-built analysis could be found, that would not count
against the Tractarian view, but rather against the first-order formalizability of statements
involving color exclusion. The third objection against the Tractarian view is much more
intricate. It is claimed that the Tractarian view jeopardizes the termination of logical formal-
22 Jackson (2007) casts doubts on the maintainability of the distinction between informal formal and informal
material validity that are related to ours.
23 Cf. Wittgenstein (1995), 6.375.
24 Cf. Sainsbury (1991), 1st ed. ch. 6.2.
25 Cf. Read (1994), p. 251.
26 For a detailed discussion cf. Lampert (2000).
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ization. For instance, take argument (d) above. It is highly dubitable whether a finite formula
assigned to a statement as “Cameron is a mother” could ever capture all the inferences as
“Cameron is a woman”, “Cameron has a child”, “Cameron is a human being” etc. that can
informally be drawn from that statement—as would be required by a Tractarian reading of
(COM). Due to the vagueness of the concept of informal validity it is unclear whether it does
even make sense to speak of a complete formalization that captures all the possible inferences
that might be drawn from “Cameron is a mother”. For brevity, call the problem of determin-
ing the informally valid inferences that have to be captured by an adequate formalization the
termination problem of (COM).
There is a semantic and a syntactic aspect to (COM)’s termination problem. As indicated
above, an unmanageable amount of inferences can be drawn from any colloquial statement
due to its semantic implications. Yet, even if the distinction between informal formal and
informal material validity could be accounted for somehow, “Cameron is a mother” would
still have an infinite amount of informal (formal) consequences—it would e.g. imply infi-
nitely many disjunctions containing “Cameron is a mother” as one disjunct. Hence, even the
non-Tractarian reading of (COM) faces a termination problem.
In the literature, the semantic termination problem of (COM) is normally advanced as
sufficient grounds on which to deny (COM) the status of a necessary condition of adequate
formalization. Contrary to correctness, completeness is merely seen as a sometimes helpful
guideline to be applied in a context-dependent way.27 However, abandoning completeness as
necessary condition of adequacy is uncalled for. If completeness is not assessed for formal-
izations of singular statements, but for formalizations 1, . . . , n of statements A1, . . . , An
such that a formalized text T is a truth-function of A1, . . . , An (cf. p. 4), the class of infer-
ences to be considered in order to determine the completeness of formalizations is limited
by the decomposition of T into A1, . . . , An . A complete formalization only has to represent
the dependencies among the component statements of T . The main reason why statements
are formalized in the first place is to transparently represent these dependencies. A thus con-
textualized completeness criterion does not face a semantic termination problem, because
only premises and conclusions of inferences have to be considered that have truth conditions
expressible within the finite vocabulary of the realizations of 1, . . . , n . As in case of
(COR), however, a syntactic termination problem remains, for even with a finite vocabulary
an infinite number of inferences can be formulated. Completely assuring the termination of
both a correctness and a completeness criterion is—as will be substantiated below—only
possible against the background of semantic variants of these criteria along with an account
of how conditions of truth and falsehood are described structurally.
(COM′) The correct28 formalizations 1, . . . , n of A1, . . . , An are complete iff every for-
malization , such that  is the formalization of an inference S, that does not
consist of premises or conclusions other than A1, . . . , An or their negations or of
verbalizations of formulae exclusively composed of the categorematic expressions
mentioned in the realizations of 1, . . . , n , and S is informally valid, is formally
valid.
27 Cf. Blau (1977), pp. 2–3 and pp. 16–17.
28 As correctness has already been established as a necessary condition for the adequacy of a formalization,
not all formalization candidates of A1, . . . , An need to be tested for completeness, but only the correct ones.
Furthermore, as shown on p. 97 above, demanding (COR)-correctness of complete formalizations guarantees
that the realizations of 1, . . . , n suit A1, . . . , An . It is plain that subject to this integration of correctness
into (COM′) the latter inherits all of the former’s problems. For the sake of spelling out completeness by
syntactic criteria we are going to disregard these problems for the moment.
123
Synthese (2008) 164:93–115 107
(COM′) limits the informally valid inferences to be captured by a complete formaliza-
tion to the inferences involving the statements A1, . . . , An and the vocabulary resorted to in
the realizations of 1, . . . , n . Inferences expressible with the categorematic elements of
1, . . . , n have to be considered in order to forestall unscrupulous formalizations. As to
(COM′), neither Fa → Ga nor Fa ∧ Ga → Ga, where F stands for “. . . is a mother”,
G for “. . . is a woman” and a for Cameron, are complete formalizations of (d). Neither
does justice to the informal dependency between “Cameron is a mother” and “Cameron is
a woman”. To see this, consider the formalization Fa ∧ Ga → Ga. Fa and Ga are two
formulae composed of categorematic expressions contained in the realization of that formal-
ization. According to that realization, Fa and Ga are to be verbalized in terms of “Cameron
is a mother” and “Cameron is a woman”, respectively. While Ga does not follow from Fa,
“Cameron is a woman” does follow from “Cameron is a mother”. Furthermore, “Cameron
is a mother” is informally equivalent to “Cameron is a mother and a woman”, whereas Fa is
not equivalent to Fa ∧ Ga. While (7) is thus determined to be incomplete by (COM′), (14),
i.e. Ga ∧ Ha → Ga where G stands for “. . . is a woman”, H for “. . . has a child” and a for
Cameron, is not identified as incomplete by (COM′): (14) not only adequately captures the
informal dependencies among the component statements of (d), but also all the inferences
expressible with the vocabulary resorted to in (14). A complete formalization as (14) can thus
be said to be maximally transparent with respect to informal dependencies among component
statements and elements of its realization. All informal dependencies are explicitly formally
represented, none are left implicit. That means the expressions assigned to the categorematic
parts of a formula by its realization are logically independent and neither tautologous nor
contradictory. This is a consequence of (COM′) that will be of considerable importance as
we go along. For the purpose of easy reference later on, let us label that requirement by (IN).
With recourse to (COR) and (COM′), correctness and completeness of the formalization
of a text T composed of statements A1, . . . , An can be syntactically defined as follows:
(SYNT ) The formalization  of a text T is correct and complete iff (COR) and (COM′) are
satisfied for all formalizations 1, . . . , n of A1, . . . , An and (COR) is satisfied
for  of T , such that  is a truth-function of 1, . . . , n .
 of T is the result of a truth-functional concatenation of 1, . . . , n , i.e. a well-formed
expression consisting of 1, . . . , n and truth-functional connectives. Demanding correct-
ness for  of T suffices to identify a truth-function of 1, . . . , n , n > 1, which shares
its truth conditions with T . This can be seen as follows: If 1, . . . , n are (COR)-correct
and (COM′)-complete for the component statements of T —as required by (SYNT )—the
realizations of 1, . . . , n exclusively assign logically independent non-tautologous and
non-contradictory expressions to the categorematic parts of these formulae. Against this
background, it is guaranteed that any truth-functional concatenation  of 1, . . . , n has
the same truth conditions as its verbalization.29 Now, if  is correct for T , T and the ver-
balization of  must be informally equivalent. For  formally implies itself and follows
from itself, thus, according to (COR), T must both informally follow from and imply the
verbalization of . Therefore, demanding correctness of  for T guarantees that  shares
its truth conditions with T .
It should be useful to sum up the interplay of the syntactic criteria of correctness and
completeness when it comes to identifying the formalization which correctly and completely
29 This would not be guaranteed without (IN). If the formula p is assigned a tautology as “It is raining or not
raining” by its realization, the verbalization of p does not coincide with p as regards truth conditions: p can
be false, its verbalization cannot.
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exhibits a text T as a truth-function of its component statements A1, . . . , An . (COR) ensures
that the realizations of 1, . . . , n suit A1, . . . , An (cf. p. 5). (COM′) then properly tailors
these realizations such that their constituents do not feature informal dependencies. More-
over, (COM′) makes sure that all informal dependencies among A1, . . . , An are formally
captured by 1, . . . , n . (SYNT ) finally identifies the proper truth-functional concatenation
of 1, . . . , n .
As indicated above, completeness is only defined as a syntactic criterion in the literature.
One reason for the lack of a semantic criterion of completeness may lie in the limitations of
formal semantics introduced in order to formulate (TC) in a way that is equivalent to (COR).
Section 2.2 has shown that truth conditions of formulae and statements are ordinarily seen
to be comparable only if interpretations of formulae are eliminated from consideration if
they are informally incoherent. This limitation of formal semantics not only gives rise to the
problem of suitable interpretations (cf. Sect. 2.2), but moreover prohibits a feasible formu-
lation of completeness by means of semantic criteria. To see this, consider the informally
unsatisfiable statement (k) along with formalization (15).
(k) Fury is a horse and no animal.
p ∧ ¬q (15)
p : Fury is a horse.; q : Fury is an animal. (16)
Recall that in order to evaluate the correctness of (15) relative to (16), the informally unsuit-
able interpretation (p) = T,(q) = F of (15) is to be eliminated from consideration. That
means this limitation of formal semantics invalidates the only model of (15). The remaining
interpretations all render (15) false. While (k) is informally unsatisfiable, (15) has no model
among its suitable interpretations. Thus, (15) is not only (TC)-correct for (k), but would
have to be seen as semantically complete as well. One of the intuitions behind demand-
ing completeness of adequate formalizations consists in requiring informal dependencies
among statements to be mirrored by formal dependencies. As (k) illustrates, this intuition
is completely distorted if a formula as (15) which is non-contradictory according to classi-
cal logic—and therefore syntactically incomplete—would have to be seen as a semantically
complete formalization of an informally contradictory statement as (k). Apart from being
counterintuitive, a semantic criterion of completeness that assesses completeness with exclu-
sive recourse to suitable interpretations would not be equivalent to syntactic completeness in
terms of (COM) or (COM′).
Completeness is commonly denied the status of a necessary condition of adequate formal-
ization, because evaluating formalizations with respect to completeness blurs the distinction
between logical formalization and semantic analysis. Maintaining this distinction amounts
to one of the core desiderata of representatives of the traditional picture. Yet, eliminating
interpretations —in addition to generating the problem of suitable interpretations—already
abolishes that distinction. In fact, it is impossible to keep logical formalization free from
semantic analysis. If, consequently, the Tractarian view is adopted, completeness should be
demanded of adequate formalizations such that informal dependencies can be accounted for
by means of (classically understood) formal dependencies. This is straightforwardly accom-
plished by extending and modifying (TC) in a way that simultaneously captures correctness
and completeness by semantic criteria and, moreover, solves the problem of suitable inter-
pretations by simply eliminating that notion:
(TC′) The formalization  of a statement A is correct and complete iff relative to all
interpretations  of ,  has the same conditions of truth and falsehood as A has
according to the informal judgement.
123
Synthese (2008) 164:93–115 109
The notions used in (TC′) are straightforward: On the side of the formulae classical formal
semantics is applied, on the side of the statements truth conditions are judged informally. The
truth conditions to be evaluated are again generated by paraphrasing the formal interpretations
with recourse to the realizations of the corresponding formulae (cf. Sect. 2.2).
(TC′), on a par with (COM′), does not demand to formalize a statement A in a way that
captures all informal inferential dependencies among A and arbitrary other statements. Cor-
respondingly, (TC′) does not demand to reveal the inner structure of an isolated statement A.
As per (TC′), all the formalizations (17)–(19) are correct and complete for
(l) There exists a mother.
p p : There exists a mother. (17)
∃x Fx F : …is a mother (18)
∃x(Gx ∧ H x) G : …is a woman ; H : …has a child (19)
However, if (l) is part of a complex statement, i.e. of a text T that features additional
statements, informal dependencies among these further statements and (l) may well impose
to reveal aspects of the inner structure of (l) in order to provide a complete formalization of
T . This is rendered explicit in the following semantic correctness and completeness criterion
for the formalization of a text T composed of statements A1, . . . , An :
(TC′T ) The formalization  of a text T is correct and complete iff (TC′) is satisfied for
all formalizations 1, . . . , n of A1, . . . , An and for  of T , such that  is a
truth-function of 1, . . . , n .
Whenever T consists of a single statement A only, (TC′T ) is equivalent to (TC′). In this
sense, (TC′T ) generalizes (TC′).
To illustrate how, based on the textual context, (TC′T ) determines to what extent the inner
structure of a statement is to be revealed by a correct and complete formalization, consider
the following exemplary conditionals in both of which (l) appears as antecedent:
(m) If there exists a mother, then somebody loves Labhaoise.
(n) If there exists a mother, then somebody is a woman.
The average English speaker will assess the statements “There exists a mother” and “Some-
body loves Labhaoise” to be informally independent: It is possible that Labhaoise is loved
without there being a mother, for instance when Labhaoise is a motherless divine being,
and mothers may well exist without anybody loving Labhaoise. In contrast, it is informally
excluded that something is a mother but no woman. Accordingly, (m) is taken to be non-
tautologous, while (n) is seen as an informal tautology. That means, in order to formally
represent the conditional (m), its antecedent and consequent can be treated as (unanalyzed)
independent propositions, whereas capturing the informal tautology (n) calls for an analysis
of (l) in terms of (19). In this sense, (20) and (21) are (TC′T )-correct and -complete for (m)
and (n), respectively.
p → q (20)
p : There exists a mother.; q : Somebody loves Labhaoise.
∃x(Gx ∧ H x) → ∃xGx (21)
G : …is a woman; H : …has a child
Yet, it might happen that somebody deviates from the average understanding of (m) and
considers that text to be an informal tautology after all. It could be argued that (m) is infor-
mally tautologous, not due to semantic dependencies among “There exists a mother” and
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“Somebody loves Labhaoise”, but due to a missing premise. Thus, (m) could be interpreted
in terms of an enthymeme with, say, “Labhaoise is the goddess of motherhood” as missing
premise. More specifically, the interpretation of (m) might be the following truth-function of
“There exists a mother”, “Labhaoise is the goddess of motherhood” and “Somebody loves
Labhaoise”:
(o) Whenever there exists a mother and Labhaoise is the goddess of motherhood and, if
there exists a mother and Labhaoise is the goddess of motherhood, then somebody loves
Labhaoise, then somebody loves Labhaoise.
Even relative to this interpretation the inner structure of (l) does not need to be formally
exhibited in order to (TC′T )-correctly and -completely account for that text:
p ∧ r ∧ (p ∧ r → q) → q (22)
p : There exists a mother.; q : Somebody loves Labhaoise.; (23)
r : Labhaoise is the goddess of motherhood.
Whenever correctness is separated from completeness, semantic criteria of adequate for-
malization face the problem of suitable interpretations. Such a separation prohibits a compar-
ison of truth conditions of formulae and statements relative to all possible interpretations. Yet,
notwithstanding the fact that the strive for complete formalizations motivates many famous
formalization efforts, (TC′T ) is in disharmony with the common formalization practice. Com-
monly, (5), i.e. p ∨ q (cf. p. 8), is thought to be adequate for (c), i.e. “Cameron is a mother
or Cameron is a woman”, in virtue of realization (6). (TC′T ), however, identifies (5) as inad-
equate: (p) = W,(q) = F renders (5) true, yet no consistent conditions of truth or
falsehood correspond informally. (TC′T ) demands more than what is usually required by a
criterion of correctness. If it is judged to be impossible for Cameron to be a mother, but no
woman, this impossibility has to be captured by a formal contradiction. Generally, not only
formal dependencies have to match informal ones, but also informal dependencies have to
be mirrored by formal ones.
This requirement is met by formalizing (c) as follows:
(p ∧ q) ∨ q (24)
p : Cameron has a child.; q : Cameron is a woman. (25)
(24) is formally equivalent to q , which exhibits that (c) has the same conditions of truth
and falsehood as “Cameron is a woman”. Moreover, the propositional variables of (24) are
assigned to informally independent statements in (25). Therefore, paraphrasing the models
and counter-models of (24) does not yield any informally incoherent conditions of truth and
falsehood. Balancing these conditions reveals that the paraphrase of every model of (24)
renders (c) true, while the paraphrase of every counter-model renders (c) false. Thus, (24) is
a (TC′T )-correct and -complete formalization of (c).
As these exemplary formalizations demonstrate, adequately formalizing a statement in
first-order logic in a way that satisfies (TC′T ) presupposes that the expressions assigned to
the categorematic parts of a formula by its realization are logically independent and neither
tautologous nor contradictory. The conditions of truth and falsehood generated by paraphras-
ing the interpretations of the formalization are required to consist of informally indepen-
dent propositions. As (COM′), thus, (TC′T ) demands maximal transparency with respect to
informal dependencies among component statements of T and the elements of a formula’s
realization. As (COM′), (TC′T ) stipulates (IN) (cf. p. 17). Common formalization practice
does not respect (IN). The reason is at hand: Logical formalization shall not be rendered
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dependent on a narrow conception of semantic analysis that explicates the conditions of truth
and falsehood of statements with reference to informally independent propositions. If the
adequacy of a formalization is judged with recourse to a criterion as (TC′T ), the amount of
statements adequately formalizable within first-order logic such that no far reaching ques-
tions of semantic analysis arise, becomes much smaller than it is usually thought to be. Ever
so often a semantic analysis of a statement that satisfies (IN) is simply not available in natural
language. Nonetheless, the ambition to straightforwardly formalize a wide range of state-
ments within first-order logic cannot be the guide to define criteria of adequate formalization.
Rather, the fact that the theoretical underpinnings of the common formalization practice only
seem to be reconstructible based on a distortion of formal semantics questions the rational
foundation of that practice. Instead, one should come to realize that first-order formalization
heavily depends on a conception of semantic analysis that exhibits complex statements as
truth-functions of informally independent propositions.
3.2 Adequacy
Contrary to the traditional picture, we thus advance both correctness and completeness as
necessary conditions of adequate formalization. As to the above considerations, this require-
ment can be spelled out either syntactically, i.e. in terms of (SYNT ), or semantically, i.e. in
terms of (TC′T ). As (SYNT ) refers to (COR) and (COM′) whose application, contrary to the
application of (TC′T ), does not terminate and involves circularities (cf. Sect. 2.2) as well as
in light of the simplicity of (TC′T ) we shall give preference to (TC′T ) in the following.
An informally valid argument is only (TC′T )-correctly and -completely formalized by a
formal implication and, analogously, an informally invalid argument must be captured by
a material implication. Thus, contrary to the traditional picture that allows for non-tautolo-
gous formalizations of informally valid arguments, defining adequate formalization based on
(TC′T ) paves the way to identify, i.e. to prove in a weak sense (cf. footnote 2), the validity
as well as the invalidity of arguments.30
Furthermore, (TC′T ) prohibits unscrupulous formalization (cf. Sect. 2.3). The formaliza-
tion of “Cameron is a mother” by Fa ∧ Ga, where F represents “. . . is a mother”, G stands
for “. . . is a woman” and a for Cameron, does not satisfy (TC′T ), because according to for-
mal semantics Fa ∧ Ga is false, if the object assigned to a is an element of (F) but not
of (G), whereas Cameron’s being a mother but no women is informally incoherent. Thus,
(TC′T ) prevents an unscrupulous formalization of argument (d). Nonetheless, (TC′T ) does
not block all trivializations of logical formalization. If a formula 1 satisfies (TC′T ) with
respect to a statement A1 contained in a text T , any formula 1 such that 1  1 satisfies
(TC′T ) as well, provided that 1 meets (IN). In this sense, all components 1, . . . , n of
a formalization  of T are replaceable by equivalent components 1, . . . , n to the effect
that the resulting formalization  of T satisfies (TC′T ) iff  satisfies (TC′T ). Hence, (TC′T )
identifies sets of logically equivalent formulae as correct and complete formalizations of a
given text. Accordingly, any formal tautology satisfying (IN) is a (TC′T )-correct and -com-
plete formalization of any uncomposed informal tautology. If the adequacy of a formalization
were only assessed with recourse to (TC′T ), it would be completely arbitrary which of p∨¬p
30 Massey (1975) pointed out that the invalidity of arguments can never be (in a weak sense) formally proven
based on correctness criteria only. This problem of invalidity proofs is generally accepted (cf. e.g. Sainsbury
(1991), pp. 68–69, 116–120). Representatives of the traditional picture hold that only the validity of arguments
can be formally identified. Within the new picture of formalization presented here, both the validity and the
invalidity of arguments can be (in a weak sense) formally proven (cf. Lampert and Baumgartner, unpublished).
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or ¬(p ∧ ¬p) etc. should be propagated as adequate representation of a statement as “It is
raining or it is not raining”. The analog holds for formal and informal contradictions.
(TC′T ) thus must be complemented by surface considerations. Accordingly, we draw on
surface similarity in order to identify adequate formulae within sets of equivalent formaliza-
tions that all satisfy (TC′T ). While the latter criterion often explicitly induces to depart from
the surface of natural language, the similarity requirement amounts to a minimalization of the
differences between logical formulae and statements. This strategy to complement (TC′T )
yields the following—surface relativized—notion of adequate formalization:
(ADS) The formalization  of a text T is adequate iff (TC′T ) is satisfied and  is at least
as similar to T as any other equivalent formula that satisfies (TC′T ).
The similarity of the syntactic features of  and T is to be measured according to strategies
(I) and (II) discussed in Section 2.3.
(ADS) does not identify one single formula as the adequate formalization of a text T , but
rather chooses formalizations that are maximally similar to T among every set of equivalent
and (TC′T )-correct and -complete formalizations of T . That means p relative to “p: Not all
martians are green” may be an adequate formalization of “Not all martians are green”, just as
¬∀x(Fx → Gx) relative to “F : …is a martian; G: …is green”. Among a set of equivalent
formulae, including p and p ∧ (p ∨ ¬p) and p ∧ (q ↔ q), (ADS) picks p as adequate
representation of “Not all martians are green”, because it is syntactically more similar to that
statement than any other member of its equivalence set. q , however, relative to “q: Not all
martians are green” is no less adequate according to (ADS). Likewise, ¬∀x(Fx → Gx)
is more similar to “Not all martians are green” than, say, the equally (TC′T )-correct and
-complete ¬∀x(¬¬Fx → Gx). By confining similarity considerations to a set of equivalent
formulae the latter are rendered comparable as regards their syntactic similarity with the
formalized statement.
4 Against reflective equilibrium
(ADS)—as the criteria of correctness and completeness—crucially rests on the notion of
informal validity. As anticipated on page 5 above, the dependency of adequate formalization
on informal validity raises the question as to how logic can serve as a means to evaluate the
validity or invalidity of arguments. How could a formalism ever identify fallacies and correct
an informal judgement in view of the fact that an adequate implementation of the formalism
presupposes that informal judgement? Moreover, what about the usefulness of relativizing
the adequacy of formalizations to a notion as vague as informal validity?
Ordinarily, such as to evade this problem, the relationship between natural and formal
languages is conceived in terms of a so-called reflective equilibrium, which derives from
Rawls (1980) and Goodman (1983).31 According to this conception, informal validity is the
gauge that measures the quality of formal definitions of what valid derivations are and for-
mal validity systemizes and regulates its informal counterpart. Formal validity analyzes and
theoretically represents informal reasoning, while informal (in)validity assessments may be
reversed for reasons of systematics, conceptual simplicity, or incompatibility with accepted
background theories. Logical formalization and its reversal, the transformation of formulae
31 Cf. e.g. Hoyningen-Huene (1998), pp. 155 et sqq., or Brun (2004), pp. 76 et sqq., Löffler (2006). For
the original context, in which the notion of a reflective equilibrium has arisen, see Rawls (1980), p. 20, and
Goodman (1983), pp. 63 et sqq.
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into statements called verbalization, are localized at the core of this equilibrium as they
mediate between the implementation of informal and formal validity.
Apart from the difficulties arising from the attempt to ground a methodology of formal-
ization on the notion of a reflective equilibrium in a sharp and non-circular way, there is one
main problem with this conception. As the notion of informal validity is presupposed by the
criteria of adequate formalization, such criteria would be deprived of their status as necessary
conditions for the adequacy of a formalization given that informal reasoning always risks
to be revised by formal constraints. Thus, as an immediate consequence of a methodology
of formalization embedded in equilibrium considerations, criteria of adequate formalization
become mere rules of thumb that are sometimes resorted to upon formalizing natural language
and sometimes neglected. Criteria are no criteria if they are open for discussion.
Endorsing the ars iudicandi conception of logic by basing formalization on rules of thumb,
in our view, is too high a price to pay. Rather, we prefer to abstain from claiming that logic pro-
vides the means to prove the (in)validity of colloquial arguments in a strong sense, according
to which proving an argument amounts to formally evaluating whether it is valid or not. For-
malizing an argument does not promote a proof in this strong sense, but, rather, an explication
of the argument.32 A formalization of an argument replaces an ambiguous and mistakable
expression by an unambiguous and unmistakable formula that transparently represents the
formal structure on which the argument is based. Formalization, thus, is a means to explicate
informal reasoning which does not rest on criteria. According to this view, formalizations
are not and will never be the result of a formal, effective formalization procedure, because
formalizing a natural language text T crucially rests on an informal understanding of T and
not simply on its surface grammar.
Admitting the impossibility to prove the validity or invalidity of arguments in a strong
sense moreover answers the question as to why we have analyzed adequate formalization
with recourse to a notion as vague as informal validity. Our analysis of adequate formalization
does not impose there to be one adequate formula for an argument—there may be many or
none at all. Rather, a formalization expresses or explicates informal reasoning relative to an
interpretation of a text T . Informal judgements about inferential dependencies among T ’s
component statements A1, . . . , An may vary and, accordingly, corresponding formalizations
differ. Nonetheless, every formalization unambiguously expresses informal judgements. We
do not claim to provide criteria that ultimately identify a specific formula as the one and only
adequate formalization of a given statement. (ADS) determines formalizations to be adequate
relative to a decomposition of T and informal judgements concerning the conditions of truth
and falsehood of A1, . . . , An , i.e. relative to an interpretation of T .
Abandoning an ars iudicandi conception of logic in favor of an ars explicandi has a num-
ber of important consequences. First, whenever internal dependencies among the statements
in a text or the truth conditions of these statements cannot be judged informally, there is no
criterion that would determine the adequacy of a respective formalization. A logical formal-
ism cannot clarify what is informally indeterminate. Second, whenever there is a conflict
between informal considerations and corresponding formalizations there do not exist two
feasible sources of error—defectiveness of the informal judgement or inadequacy of the for-
malization—but only one: In case of conflict it is always the formalization that is in need
of revision. Third, a logical formalism can never revise informal reasoning. Whenever an
argument is informally claimed to be valid, it cannot be identified as a fallacy. There are no
32 We do not use the term ‘explication’ in Carnap’s sense (cf. Carnap (1971), Subsect. 2–3). While for Carnap
explicandum and explicans may differ in meaning or truth conditions, respectively, (TC′T ) determines that
a formal explicans coincides with its informal explicandum with regard to truth conditions. In virtue of its
syntax alone the formalization explicates the informally assessed truth conditions of the formalized text.
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informal fallacies. What is ordinarily called a ‘fallacy’ or a ‘paradox’ is not mistaken infor-
mal reasoning, but rather a misunderstanding of informal arguments expressed by inadequate
formalizations.
To somebody professing the traditional ars iudicandi conception of logic these conse-
quences, most likely, seem counterintuitive. Presupposing clarity about informal inferential
dependencies among components of a formalized text, however, is not a peculiarity of the
new picture of adequate formalization. As Sect. 2.2 has shown, such transparency is also a
precondition of applying the traditional correctness criterion. According to both the tradi-
tional and the new picture, the adequacy of formalizations cannot be judged without explicit
informal judgements about the whole argumentative context. Yet, whoever sees logic as an
ars iudicandi and, thus, claims that formalizing an argument may decide on its informal
validity, tacitly presupposes that the adequacy of a formalization is independent of a prior
judgement as to the validity of the corresponding argument. If formalizations are brought to
bear in order to evaluate the validity of an argument, the adequacy of these formalizations
must be established without drawing on an informal validity judgement. However, the liter-
ature developing the traditional picture of formalization does not even provide sketches of
an adequacy criterion that would be independent of informal validity judgements or infor-
mal assessments of truth conditions of the constituents of formalized arguments. As soon as
one comes to realize that, first, the adequacy of formalizations must be justified if anything
interesting is to be gained from formalizing arguments and, second, that such a justification
inescapably hinges on clarity about the informal validity of the argument and the truth condi-
tions of its premises and conclusion, abstaining from the traditional ars iudicandi conception
of logic appears as the only remaining consequence. One of the main goals of this paper,
accordingly, has been to show that intuitions to the contrary, regardless of their prevalence,
are ill-founded.
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